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Abstract 
Commitment problems are inherent to non-binding conflict resolution 
mechanisms, since an unsatisfied party can ignore the resolution and initiate 
conflict. We provide experimental evidence suggesting that even in the absence of 
binding contractual agreements individuals often avoid conflict by committing to 
the outcome of a conflict resolution mechanism. Commitment problems are 
mitigated to a greater extent for groups who opt-in to the conflict resolution 
mechanism, but only when opting-in is costly. Although conflict rates are higher 
when opting-in is costly than when it is free or exogenously imposed, 
commitment problems are greatly reduced amongst those groups who choose to 
opt-in.  
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1. Introduction 
Since Schelling (1960) initiated the formal study of conflict, economists and others have 
developed numerous models highlighting the resources wasted when conflict occurs (Tullock, 
1980; Konrad, 2009). Empirical studies testing these models indicate that in practice the costs of 
conflict are substantially higher than predicted by the theory (Dechenaux et al., 2012; Sheremeta, 
2013). For this reason, there has been extensive research on mechanisms of conflict resolution 
that allow parties to avoid to these costs, all of which depend on the ability to make credible 
commitments and/or binding contracts enforced by a third party (see e.g. Schelling 1960, 
Williamson 1985, Charness et al. 2007, Kimbrough et al. 2012; Kimbrough and Sheremeta, 
2013). Yet, in reality, many conflict resolution efforts cannot rely on credible commitments or 
enforceable contracts.  
The problems associated with the inability to commit are well known: in the absence of 
credible commitment, parties on the less favored side of any proposed resolution face incentives 
to ignore the resolution. For example, a country that finds a UN resolution counter to its interests 
could simply exit the organization and ignore the international community. A similar 
commitment problem can help to explain the failures of recent WTO negotiations and the Kyoto 
Protocol.
1
 Agreements between individuals often face similar problems, especially when third-
party enforcement mechanisms are unavailable. Historically, weak and decentralized political 
rule made many contractual agreements legally unenforceable (Milgrom et al., 1990; Greif et al., 
1994; Greif, 2000), and similar troubles plague contemporary societies where the rule of law is 
absent or weak. Even when the rule of law is present many contracts remain unenforceable, and 
commitment problems arise due to imperfect information and incomplete contracts (Harris and 
Raviv, 1979; Holmström, 1979; Baker, 1992; Tirole, 1999). 
                                                        
1
 See Powell (2006) for a discussion of commitment problems and armed conflict between nations. 
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Given the ubiquity of commitment problems in conflict resolution, there has been 
surprisingly little empirical work exploring the possibility of conflict resolution in the absence of 
binding commitments.
2
 In this paper, we explore whether (and how) non-binding conflict 
resolution mechanisms reduce conflict and overcome commitment problems under rather 
extreme conditions. We conduct an experiment where participants face potential conflict over a 
valuable, indivisible resource. Parties may choose to allocate the resource by costly conflict (i.e., 
a rent-seeking contest), or they can choose to employ a conflict resolution mechanism that 
allocates the resource at random (i.e., a coin flip), allowing them to avoid the costs of fighting. 
However, for this mechanism to be effective, both participants must first opt-in to learn the 
proposed allocation and then mutually commit to the outcome. If either party chooses not to 
commit, the parties then fight over the resource. The indivisibility of the resource is crucial here 
because it creates a particularly “hard case” for conflict resolution efforts: commitment requires 
one party to accept extreme inequality. 
Clearly, standard game theoretic arguments predict that even if both parties opt-in to 
observe the proposed allocation, the losing party will never commit to the outcome. 
Nevertheless, we observe many instances in which individuals avoid conflict by committing to 
the outcome of a coin flip; conflict resolution rates range between 20%-54%, depending on the 
treatment. Moreover, commitment problems are further mitigated when groups endogenously 
choose to opt-in to the conflict resolution mechanism, but only when opting-in is costly. 
Although conflict rates are higher when opting-in is costly than when it is free or exogenously 
                                                        
2
 See the review of experimental literature on conflicts by Dechenaux et al. (2012). Several conflict resolution 
mechanisms have been examined in the lab, including side-payments (Charness et al., 2007; Kimbrough and 
Sheremeta, 2012, 2013), pre-commitment to an allocation proposed by a random device (Kimbrough et al., 2012), 
and communication (Cason et al., 2013). Also, some animal behavior studies indicate that many non-human species 
employ non-binding resource-allocation conventions built around asymmetries between parties that are uncorrelated 
with their fighting abilities (Petrie et al., 1991; Maher and Lott, 2000). 
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imposed (in many instances pairs do not opt-in), commitment problems are greatly reduced 
amongst those groups that opt-in.  
Thus, our paper makes two key contributions. First, we provide evidence that conflict 
resolution efforts can overcome commitment problems, even when resolutions generate extreme 
payoff inequality. This suggests that the prospects for reducing the costs of conflict are not as 
bleak as standard theory would suggest (Tullock, 1980; Konrad, 2009). This finding assumes 
additional importance given the extensive experimental literature demonstrating the very high 
costs of conflict (Dechenaux et al., 2012; Sheremeta, 2013).
3
 Second, we show that commitment 
problems can be further mitigated by imposing explicit costs for using conflict resolution 
mechanisms.
4
 A costly mechanism serves two purposes: it encourages reciprocity because parties 
both know that their counterpart paid a cost to potentially avoid conflict, and it facilitates self-
selection, since individuals who are unwilling to commit are less likely to incur the cost in the 
first place. Thus, we argue that designers of conflict resolution mechanisms should consider 
ways of ensuring that parties are invested in the conflict resolution process, and we hope that 
theorists can further develop models to explain the source of this effect. 
 
2. Experimental Design and Procedures 
2.1. Experimental Design 
Our experiment employs a simple conflict resolution game in which participants play a repeated 
game with a known ending, repeatedly bargaining over an indivisible resource valued at v by 
                                                        
3
 Sheremeta (2013) reviews 30 conflict experiments and finds that in 28 of those experiments individuals exert 
significantly higher conflict expenditures than predicted. In some conflict experiments the expenditures are so high 
that the majority of individuals earn negative payoffs (Sheremeta, 2010; Deck and Sheremeta, 2012). 
4
 There is a large literature in biology suggesting that costly signals are more reliable than cheap signals (Zahavi, 
1975, 1993; Grafen, 1990; Petrie et al., 1991). Likewise, there is a significant literature in the economics of religion 
suggesting that costly or stigmatizing religious rituals dramatically increase cooperation within religious “clubs” 
(Iannaccone, 1992, 1994; Berman, 2000; Abramitzky, 2008; Aimone et al., 2013; Carvalho 2013). 
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both players. The game, shown in Figure 1, consists of three stages. In Stage 1, participants 
choose whether or not to use the conflict resolution device by choosing either ‘Flip’ or ‘Don’t 
Flip’. If at least one participant chooses Don’t Flip then neither participant incurs any cost, and 
both proceed to Stage 3. If both participants choose to Flip then they each incur a cost c, and 
after observing a realization of a fair coin flip, which provisionally assigns the resource to one 
player, they proceed to Stage 2. In Stage 2, participants decide whether to ‘Agree’ to the 
proposed allocation. If both participants choose Agree (i.e., if they choose to commit) then the 
participant who was favored by the coin flip receives v = 100 francs, and the game is over. 
However, if at least one participant chooses ‘Don’t Agree’, then both participants proceed to 
Stage 3. In Stage 3, both participants participate in a lottery contest to allocate the resource. In 
the lottery contest, both participants make irreversible conflict expenditures e1 and e2 to increase 
their probabilities of receiving the prize, i.e., pi(e1,e2) = ei/(e1+e2).  
Using backwards induction and assuming risk neutrality, the Nash equilibrium in Stage 3 
is for both participants to choose expenditures of e1* = e2* = 25 (Tullock, 1980), receiving the 
expected payoff of 25 each (v/2-e* = 50-25). Because each participant has a positive expected 
value from conflict in Stage 3, a participant interested in maximizing her wealth should not 
commit to the outcome after losing the coin flip. Therefore, in any subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium, money-maximizing participants end up in a conflict Stage 3 regardless of the cost of 
the coin flip c and exert wasteful expenditures competing for the resource. Since conflict is 
certain along the equilibrium path, it follows that participants are indifferent between opting-in 
and not opting-in if and only if the cost of opting-in is zero (i.e., c = 0), and they will never opt-
in when doing so is costly (i.e., c > 0). 
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To examine whether a non-binding coin flip can reduce the cost of conflict, we employ a 
partial two-by-two experimental design. On one dimension, we vary whether the decision to opt-
in is endogenous or exogenous, and on the other dimension, we vary whether opting-in carries a 
cost. For obvious reasons, we impose the cost only when opting-in is endogenous, hence our 
partial design. In the Exogenous-Free baseline treatment, participants first observe the outcome 
of a coin flip. That is, there is no Stage 1 decision to ‘Flip’ or ‘Don’t Flip’; instead, the ‘Flip’ 
decision is exogenously imposed. In Stage 2, they decide whether to commit to the outcome. If 
either participant disagrees then the game proceeds to Stage 3. In Stage 3, participants participate 
in a simple two-person contest for the resource valued at 100. In the Endogenous-Free treatment, 
participants first endogenously decide whether to observe the outcome of a coin flip for free in 
Stage 1. Then in Stage 2 they decide whether to commit to the outcome. If either participant 
disagrees in either Stage 1 or Stage 2 then the game proceeds to Stage 3. Finally, the 
Endogenous-Costly treatment is similar to the Endogenous-Free treatment, however, opting-in in 
Stage 1 is costly, i.e., c = 5 francs.  
 
2.2. Experimental Procedures 
To study behavior in the proposed treatments, a total of 198 participants were recruited at 
random from the subject-pool consisting of graduate and undergraduate students at a private 
university in the United States. Participants received a participation fee for arriving to the 
experiment on time and received their earnings in cash privately at the end of each session. 
Participants were randomly assigned into treatments (44 in Exogenous-Free, 62 in Endogenous-
Free and 92 in Endogenous-Costly) and nobody participated more than once.
5
 Participants sat at, 
and interacted via, visually isolated computer terminals, and instructions were read aloud by the 
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 Our design was unbalanced to generate comparable sample sizes for the commitment decision across treatments. 
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experimenter as participants followed along on paper. The experiments were programmed using 
z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Before the experiment began participants took a quiz (non-
incentivized) to confirm their understanding of the experimental procedures. An experimenter 
reviewed the quiz answers and privately answered questions. 
Each experimental session consisted of 30 periods of a single treatment. Participants were 
randomly assigned to a group of two and remained within this group for all 30 periods of the 
experiment (fixed matching). In every session, each period proceeded according to one of the 
treatments. In Stage 1 participants chose between `Flip’ and `Don’t Flip’ (except in the 
Exogenous-Free treatment). In Stage 2, those who opted to see the coin flip chose between 
`Agree’ and `Don’t Agree’ after seeing the result of the flip. In Stage 3, participants chose to 
expend any number between 0 and 100 francs, in order to increase the probability of winning the 
prize of 100 francs. At the end of each period, the computer displayed individual decisions, as 
well as corresponding payoffs, to each participant. 
At the end of each experimental session, participants completed a brief demographic 
survey and their total earnings from all 30 periods of the experiment were added to or subtracted 
from an initial endowment of 2,000 francs (which we described as a participation fee). We 
converted francs to USD at a rate of 100 francs = $1, and participants were paid privately in cash 
and dismissed from the experiment. The average experimental earnings, including the $20 
participation fee, were $25.24, ranging from a low of $16.00 to a high of $46.70. Sessions lasted 
approximately one hour each. 
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3. Results 
We observed early period variation that settled down after a few periods and endgame effects, 
both of which introduced noise into our data. Thus, we restrict our analysis to periods 5-29.
6
 
Table 1 reports average frequency of conflict resolution, opting-in and commitment, as well as 
conflict expenditures and payoffs. We also report the statistical significance of estimated 
treatment effects for each of the outcome variables of interest. To control for repeated measures, 
our regressions employ mixed-effects models. The fixed effects are identical across regressions; 
we include treatment dummy variables and a period trend. Rows 1-3 of Table 1 employ random 
effects for each group, and rows 4-6 employ random effects for each group and nested 
participant-in-group. Rows 1-4 estimate logistic regressions and rows 5-6 estimate linear models. 
 
3.1. Conflict Resolution 
In the Exogenous-Free treatment, pairs avoided conflict 54% of the time (i.e., they agree to the 
result of the Flip), while in the Endogenous-Free and Endogenous-Costly treatments, pairs 
avoided conflict 41% and 20% of the time, respectively. Mixed-effects logistic regression 
analysis indicates that the rate of conflict resolution is significantly lower in the Endogenous-
Costly treatment than in the Exogenous-Free and Endogenous-Free treatments (p-values < 0.01), 
while there is no significant difference between the Free treatments (p-value = 0.24). 
 
Result 1: Contrary to standard game theoretic predictions, there is substantial conflict resolution 
in all three treatments, although pairs avoid conflict more frequently in the Exogenous-Free and 
Endogenous-Free treatments than in the Endogenous-Costly treatment. 
                                                        
6
 None of our results are qualitatively altered when we vary these cutoffs, and additional regression output is 
available from the authors upon request. 
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This finding provides support for the idea that non-binding conflict resolution 
mechanisms can reduce the frequency of conflict, despite incentives to renege. When using the 
mechanism is a default, some groups are able to coordinate on a reciprocal strategy in which the 
losing party is willing to accept an unfavorable resolution. However, the mechanism is far from 
perfect. When the decision to use the mechanism is endogenous, conflict frequency increased as 
some groups opted not to see the coin flip. Similarly, there is extensive heterogeneity in the 
willingness to commit to the outcome, which we discuss further in Section 3.5. 
 
3.2. Opting-In 
A major source of increased conflict frequency in the Endogenous-Free and Endogenous-Costly 
treatments is failure to opt-in to the coin flip mechanism. While pairs were required to see the 
flip in the Exogenous-Free treatment, they opted to see the coin flip 71% of the time in the 
Endogenous-Free treatment and only 26% of the time in the Endogenous-Costly treatment. 
Mixed-effects logistic regression analysis indicates that the rate of opting-in is significantly 
lower in the Endogenous-Costly treatment than in the Endogenous-Free treatment (p-value < 
0.01). Here we exclude the Exogenous-Free treatment from the regression since all pairs were 
forced to see the coin flip. 
 
Result 2: Subjects opted-in to the coin flip mechanism less frequently in the Endogenous-Costly 
treatment than in the Endogenous-Free treatment, although the likelihood was far greater than 0 
(and less than 1) in both treatments. 
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While it is clear that the cost of observing the coin flip played an important role in 
reducing the frequency with which participants opted-in in the Endogenous-Costly treatment, the 
reasons are less clear in the Endogenous-Free treatment. In theory, participants should be 
indifferent between observing the coin flip and not observing the flip. Indeed, if there were any 
probability that a player who lost the flip would tremble and mistakenly accept the outcome, 
players would strictly prefer to flip the coin. We leave this question for future research. 
 
3.3. Commitment 
The money-maximizing subgame perfect Nash equilibrium predicts that participants losing the 
coin flip will never commit to the outcome. Comparing averages across treatments in Table 1, 
we found that the probability that both parties committed to the outcome (conditional on seeing 
the flip) were 54% in the Exogenous-Free, 58% in the Endogenous-Free, and 76% in the 
Endogenous-Costly treatment. Mixed-effects logistic regression analysis indicates that 
conditional probability that both parties commit to the coin flip resolution is significantly higher 
in the Endogenous-Costly treatment than in either the Endogenous-Free or Exogenous-Free 
treatments (p-values < 0.01). 
The treatment differences were almost solely driven by an increased willingness of 
participants who lose the coin flip to commit to its outcome. The conditional probability of 
committing to the flip among those receiving unfavorable outcomes was 58% in Exogenous-
Free, 61% in Endogenous-Free, and 78% in Endogenous-Costly treatment.
7
 To provide 
statistical support for treatment differences in individual commitment decisions, we estimate an 
additional mixed-effects logistic regression. The dependent variable takes a value of 1 when an 
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 In all treatments the conditional probability of commitment for flip winners was at least 95%. Rejections are 
concentrated in a few individuals (44 of the 76 rejections come from 9 of 198 participants, three per treatment). 
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individual agreed to the outcome of the flip and 0 otherwise, and we restrict the sample of 
observations to the losers of the coin flip (they are the only ones facing commitment problems). 
The independent variables are a period trend and the three treatment dummy variables. Nested 
random effects are included for each participant-in-group to control for repeated measures. The 
coefficient on the Endogenous-Costly treatment is positive and significant (p-value < 0.01), and 
the difference between the Endogenous-Free and Endogenous-Costly coefficients is significant 
(p-value = 0.02). These findings are summarized in Result 3.  
 
Result 3: The conditional probability of commitment is higher in the Endogenous-Costly 
treatment than either in the Endogenous-Free or Exogenous-Free treatments. There is no 
significant difference between the Endogenous-Free and Exogenous-Free treatments. 
 
These results suggest that merely endogenizing the decision to seek third-party conflict 
resolution does not have an impact on the probability that parties commit to the proposed 
resolution – we find no difference in commitment rates in the Endogenous-Free and Exogenous-
Free treatments. However, the commitment problem is significantly mitigated when both parties 
must incur a cost to learn the proposed allocation. 
The relationship between opting-in and the commitment problem in the Endogenous-Free 
and Endogenous-Costly treatments is demonstrated in Figure 2, which plots the relative 
frequency of opting-in against the conditional probability of commitment for each pair with 
smoothing splines fit to the data by treatment.
8
 Only the Endogenous-Free and Endogenous-
Costly treatments are plotted, since participants in the Exogenous-Free treatment always saw the 
coin flip. Figure 2 indicates that there is a linear relationship between opting-in and committing 
                                                        
8
 An alternative figure containing data from all 30 periods is in Appendix B. 
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to the outcome of the flip in the Endogenous-Costly treatment, but there is a convex relationship 
between the two in the Endogenous-Free treatment – there is a pair that sees the flip in every 
period, but never commits to the outcome. In fact, while the Endogenous-Costly treatment data is 
roughly symmetrically distributed around the 45-degree line, every Endogenous-Free treatment 
observation lies on or below the line. In the Endogenous-Free treatment, commitment is 
regularly sustained only at high rates of opting-in. This provides further evidence that the 
opportunity cost of opting-in in the Endogenous-Costly treatment facilitates the solution of the 
commitment problem, while the absence of such a cost in the Endogenous-Free treatment 
renders the cooperative signal less informative and is thus less effective at encouraging 
commitment. 
 
3.4. Conflict Expenditures 
If groups did not opt-in or failed to solve the commitment problem, the group entered the conflict 
stage in which they exerted expenditures to win the prize. Returning to Table 1, note that the 
average expenditure was greatest in Exogenous-Free treatment (28.6), followed by the 
Endogenous-Free treatment (24.6), and the least in the Endogenous-Costly treatment (18.6).
9
 
Mixed-effects linear regression analysis with nested random effects for each participant-in-group 
indicates that conflict expenditures are substantially (but only marginally significantly) lower in 
the Endogenous-Costly treatment than in the Exogenous-Free treatment (p-value = 0.074). There 
is no significant difference between the Endogenous-Costly and Endogenous-Free treatments (p-
value = 0.16) or between the Endogenous-Free and Exogenous-Free treatments (p-value = 0.65). 
  
                                                        
9
 Figures B1-B3 in Appendix B report time series of conflict expenditures for each pair by treatment. 
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Result 4: Conflict expenditures are lower in the Endogenous-Costly treatment than in the 
Exogenous-Free treatment. There is no statistically significant difference between the 
Endogenous-Costly and Endogenous-Free treatments or between the Endogenous-Free and 
Exogenous-Free treatments. 
  
3.5. Between-Pair Heterogeneity 
Figure 3 displays, for each treatment, the relative frequency of opting-in, conditional frequency 
of commitment, and average payoff, by pair, where the pairs are sorted from left to right in each 
panel by opting-in rate with ties broken by commitment rate and then average payoff.  
In the Endogenous-Free treatment, there is a significant positive correlation between a 
pair’s observed probability of opting-in and average payoff (ρ = 0.62, p-value < 0.01) but in the 
Endogenous-Costly treatment, this relationship is not statistically significant (ρ = 0.23, p-value = 
0.12). This is driven by a number of pairs in the Endogenous-Costly treatment that never opted-
in to see the coin flip but nevertheless received very high payoffs. 
It is possible to visually identify three types of pairs in the Endogenous-Costly treatment: 
(1) pairs with a high rate of both opting-in and commitment, (2) pairs with low (but positive) 
rates of both opting-in and commitment, and (3) pairs with zero rates of opting-in. Heuristically, 
we define high flip pairs as those with opting-in rates in the interval (0.5, 1], low flip pairs as 
those with opting-in rates in (0, 0.5], and no flip pairs as those with opting-in rates of exactly 0. 
High flip pairs earn on average 85 francs/period (SD = 15.6), low flip pairs earn 50 francs/period 
(SD = 38.8), and no flip pairs earn 73 francs/period (SD = 24.6). Interestingly, 5 of the no flip 
pairs in the Endogenous-Costly treatment (i.e., pairs that engaged in conflict in each period 5-29) 
generated average earnings greater than the maximum that could be earned per period by opting-
13 
 
in and committing in every period (i.e., greater than 90 francs). None of the no flip pairs in the 
Endogenous-Free treatment were able generate average earnings greater than 90 francs. 
While our data do not allow us to directly identify the source of this behavior, we 
conjecture the positive commitment cost generated an endogenous focal point for conflict 
expenditures that allowed some pairs to coordinate on expenditures far below the Nash 
equilibrium of 25. Wald tests cannot reject the null hypotheses that the average conflict 
expenditure for the Exogenous-Free or Endogenous-Free pairs was the Nash Equilibrium value 
of 25 (p-value = 0.95 and p-value = 0.44, respectively). However, in the Exogenous-Costly pairs, 
the average expenditure was significantly less than 25 (p-value < 0.01). When we exclude the no 
flip pairs, the average expenditure rises and is not significantly different from 25 (p-value = 
0.63). 
 
4. Discussion 
In all three treatments, the prediction from standard game theory is that the loser of the coin flip 
will never choose to commit, as the expected value from conflict is strictly positive. 
Nevertheless, our experiment shows that individuals often avoid conflict by committing to the 
outcome of a randomizing conflict resolution mechanism, even in the absence of binding 
contractual agreements. What can explain these non-zero levels of commitment? There are 
several reasons why commitment problems can be solved in the absence of external enforcement. 
First, game theory shows that simple rational agents may abide by the outcome of the conflict 
resolution mechanism as a result of a correlated equilibrium (Aumann, 1987; Gintis, 2009). In 
such a case, a coin flip may serve as a coordination device. Second, if the parties expect to 
engage in repeated interaction, they may be able to overcome the commitment problem due to 
14 
 
reputational concerns (Rabin, 1991; Andreoni and Miller, 1993; Dellarocas, 2006) or fear of 
incurring retaliation and spite (Abbink et al., 2010; Lacomba et al., 2011; Mago et al., 2012; 
Schniter et al., 2013). Similarly, some individuals may simply prefer to avoid conflict or be 
cooperative (Dorris, 1972; Molander, 1985), and given repeated interaction, they establish a 
reputation for cooperation that allows both parties to gain from exchange. As long as one 
member of the group is a cooperative type, the other member may be willing to forgo conflict to 
reap the gains from exchange (e.g., Kreps et al. 1982). For these reasons, it may not be that 
surprising that in all three treatments we observe substantial conflict resolution. 
One of the main research questions was whether commitment problems could be 
mitigated when participants are given the option of opting-in to the conflict resolution 
mechanism (with and without cost). Here, the failure of participants to opt-in reduced the 
frequency of conflict resolution relative to the exogenous case, and more so when seeing the flip 
was costly. However, for participants that did opt-in, we observed significantly higher 
commitment, but only when opting-in was costly.  
Standard models do not predict these treatment differences. What can explain these 
differences in commitment rates? There are several non-mutually exclusive (and non-exhaustive) 
possibilities. First, when individuals act collectively to propose a solution to a social dilemma, 
the result may be seen as more legitimate than when the proposed solution comes from 
“outside”, thus increasing cooperation levels. Evidence from both field studies and laboratory 
experiments suggests that endogenous participation in democratic institutions may encourage 
both cooperation and compliance (see Dal Bo et al., 2010). Although we believe that legitimacy 
may play a role in helping groups to resolve commitment problems, our data do not provide 
support for this hypothesis. Specifically, the legitimacy hypothesis would suggest that since 
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participants choose to opt-in to the conflict resolution mechanism, the coin flip outcome will 
acquire additional legitimacy in both participants’ eyes and will thus facilitate solving the 
commitment problem. Hence, we would expect commitment rates to be greater in both the 
Endogenous-Free and Endogenous-Costly treatments than in the Exogenous-Free treatment. 
However, we find no significant difference in commitment rates between the Endogenous-Free 
and Exogenous-Free treatments.  
A second possible explanation of our observations is that fears of retaliation and spite 
may discourage participants from reneging (i.e., opting-in and then not abiding by the outcome 
may encourage high bids by angered flip winners) (Andreoni and Miller, 1993; Dellarocas, 2006; 
Lacomba et al., 2011; Schniter et al., 2013). While we cannot rule out this explanation, our data 
do not reveal notable differences in the conflict expenditures of flip winners and losers. 
Additional unreported regressions (available upon request) indicate that the only significant 
difference is that flip losers bid more than winners in the Endogenous-Costly treatment, opposite 
to the direction of the retaliation hypothesis. 
A third explanation is that individuals who pay to see the coin flip may be subject to a 
sunk cost fallacy; they might justify committing to the coin flip in order to avoid the regret of 
wasting money on unused advice (Arkes and Blumer, 1985; Gino, 2008). We cannot rule out this 
explanation – though it seems implausible since the expected value of conflict is positive and 
greater than the sunk cost of seeing the flip. 
A final explanation receives the most substantial support from our data: the act of opting-
in may serve as a signal of participant’s willingness to cooperate. That is, commitment is 
encouraged when both parties know that the other has deliberately sent a signal of willingness to 
cooperate, but this signal is more than cheap talk only when it involves incurring an opportunity 
16 
 
cost.
10
Under this interpretation, the willingness to incur a cost of opting-in indicates a 
willingness to accept the outcome of the coin flip, and agents are able to infer cooperative 
intentions (to commit) more readily from costly opting-in than from free opting-in. In this sense, 
the mechanism encourages self-selection among cooperative types. In the repeated game setting, 
non-cooperative types are going to be found out early on unless they feign being a cooperative 
type. It may therefore be worthwhile to opt-in to see whether one is paired with a cooperative 
type, since they can always avoid the costly conflict resolution mechanism in the future after 
they have been cheated once. These considerations may explain why commitment rates are 
greater in treatments where opting-in is costly than when it is exogenous or costless. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper explores the effectiveness of non-binding institutions for conflict resolution and the 
effect of endogenous institutional choice on their success. Empirically, the main problem with 
such mechanisms is: how do groups commit to abiding by the outcome of a conflict resolution 
mechanism? This paper suggests that one way of mitigating this problem is to make the choice of 
opting-in to the mechanism costly. Although the mere act of opting-in has no significant impact 
on commitment rates, costly opting-in substantially increases commitment for groups who pay 
the price. 
Our results have important implications for the sustainability of cooperation and the 
mitigation of conflict in environments with weak contract enforcement. First, using a coin flip as 
a conflict resolution mechanism has numerous benefits for studying the commitment problems 
inherent in conflict resolution: it is transparent and easy to understand, it provides an unbiased 
                                                        
10
 Indeed, there is evidence for this in other contexts where incurred opportunity costs facilitate reciprocity (McCabe 
et al., 2000, 2003). 
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means of allocating indivisible resources (consistent with egalitarian norms), and its “all-or-
nothing” nature exacerbates the commitment problem, since losing participants must commit to 
receiving nothing.
11
 Second, endogenizing and imposing a cost on the decision to opt-in activates 
reciprocity – by requiring individuals to undertake an opportunity cost to seek conflict resolution, 
the decision substantially increases the rate at which parties commit to conflict resolution. These 
(and similar) behavioral mechanisms are clearly important drivers of economic behavior and thus 
have an important role in any institutional design framework. When developing institutions to 
reduce conflict and facilitate mutually beneficial exchange, designers should consider not only 
standard incentive-compatibility issues but also the interaction between institutions and norms of 
cooperation and reciprocity. In particular, when the absence of exogenous enforcement 
mechanisms renders incentive-compatible arrangements infeasible, one way to reduce the costs 
of conflict may involve institutions designed to encourage reciprocity-driven pro-sociality. 
  
                                                        
11
 Using a random device as a conflict resolution mechanism has a long history. Iannaccone et al. (2011) argue that 
the Oracle at Delphi promoted cooperation amongst the Greek city-states despite providing random outcomes. 
Another well-known historical example of commitment to a random device is the battlefield agreement to settle a 
conflict by single combat between two renowned warriors. More familiar examples of conflict resolution via random 
device are abundant. Rock-paper-scissors, drawing straws, and throwing dice settle many friendly disputes. 
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Table 1: Average Frequency of Conflict Resolution, Opting-in and Commitment, as well as 
Conflict Expenditures and Payoffs (Periods 5-29) 
 
  Treatment 
  Exogenous-Free Endogenous-Free Endogenous-Costly 
Conflict Resolution 0.54 (0.50) 0.41 (0.49)  0.20 (0.40) *# 
 N=550 N=775 N=1150 
     
Both Opt-In 1.00 0.71 (0.46) * 0.26 (0.44) *# 
  N=550 N=775 N=1150 
     
Both Commit  
 
0.54 (0.50) 
N=550 
0.58 (0.49) 0.76 (0.43) *# 
N=547 N=296 
    
Flip-Loser Commits 0.58 (0.49) 0.61 (0.49) 0.78 (0.42)*# 
 N=550 N=547 N=296 
    
Conflict Expenditure 28.56 (18.93) 24.62 (20.08)  18.58 (19.27) ^ 
 N=502 N=912 N=1848 
     
Payoff 
 
36.97 (52.54) 35.52 (51.59) 33.53 (51.19) 
N=1100 N=1550 N=2300 
Standard deviation reported in parentheses. Each reported variable was regressed against treatment dummy 
variables and a period trend, with standard errors clustered at the group level. Rows 1-3 employ mixed-effects 
models with random effects for each group, and rows 4-6 employ mixed-effects models with random effects for 
each group and nested participant-in-group. Rows 1-4 estimate logistic regressions and rows 5-6 estimate linear 
models. Amounts noted with * signify the treatment coefficient was significantly different from the Exogenous-
Free coefficient, p-value < 0.05. Amounts noted with # signify the treatment coefficient was significantly 
different from the Endogenous-Free coefficient, p-value < 0.05. Amounts noted with ^ signify the treatment 
coefficient was significantly different from the Exogenous-Free coefficient, p-value < 0.1. 
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Figure 1: Game Tree 
 
 
 
  
Player 1 
Player 2 
Flip Don’t Flip 
Don’t Flip Flip Flip Don’t Flip 
Stage 1:  
Opting-in 
Player 1 
Player 2 
Agree Don’t Agree 
Don’t Agree Agree Agree Don’t Agree 
Both Players See 
Results of Flip 
Expected payoff 
π1 = v/2 - c 
π2 = v/2 - c 
Stage 2: 
Commitment 
Stage 3: 
Contest 
Expected payoff 
π1 = ve1/(e1+e2) - e1 - c 
π2 = ve2/(e1+e2) - e2 - c 
Stage 3: 
Contest 
Expected payoff 
π1 = ve1/(e1+e2) – e1 
π2 = ve2/(e1+e2) – e2 
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Figure 2: Probability of Both Opting-in vs. Conditional Probability of Both Committing 
(Endogenous-Free and Endogenous-Costly Treatments, Periods 5-29) 
 
 
Note: Each point represents the probability of opting-in and the conditional probability of commitment for a single 
pair over periods 5-29; the lines plot smoothing spline fits to the data with 3 DF. 
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Figure 3: Average Profits, Opting-in and Commitment by Pair and Treatment 
 (Periods 5-29)
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Appendix A (Not for Publication) – Instructions 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
This is an experiment in the economics of strategic decision-making. Various research agencies have 
provided funds for this research. If you follow the instructions closely and make appropriate decisions, you can earn 
an appreciable amount of money, which will be paid to you in cash.  
The currency used in the experiment is francs. Francs will be converted to U.S. Dollars at a rate of _100_ 
francs to _1_ dollar. You have already earned a $20.00 participation fee (this includes the $7 show up fee). The 
experiment will consist of 30 periods and at the end of the experiment we sum your total earnings for all 30 periods 
and convert them to a U.S. dollar payment. 
It is very important that you remain silent and do not look at others’ decisions (screens). If you have any 
questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to you. If you talk, 
laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and you will not be paid. We expect and appreciate you 
following the laboratory's rules. The remainder of the instructions will describe the decisions you may face in each 
period. 
The participants in today’s experiment will be randomly assigned into two-participant groups. You and the 
other participant in your group will make choices that will determine your payoffs. The experiment contains 30 
periods. You will remain within the same two-participant group for all 30 periods.  
In each period of the experiment one of the two participants in your group will receive the reward.  The 
reward is worth 100 francs. Each period of the experiment consists of as many as three decision stages.  
 
YOUR DECISION IN STAGE 1 
In Stage 1, both participants will have the opportunity to choose whether they want to Flip a computer coin 
in order to determine who will receive the reward. An example of your decision screen is shown below. 
 
If you want to flip the coin, check Flip. If both participants choose Flip, the computer will subtract 5 
francs from both participants’ earnings for the period, and both participants will enter Stage 2. However, if either 
participant chooses Don’t Flip, then both participants will skip Stage 2 and enter Stage 3, and the 5 francs will not 
be subtracted from either participant. 
 
YOUR DECISION IN STAGE 2 
If both participants choose Flip in Stage 1, the computer will flip a coin. There is a 50% chance the coin 
lands heads, and 50% chance the coin lands tails. If the computer coin lands heads one participant will receive the 
reward, if it lands tails, the other participant receives the reward. The flip outcome determines who receives the 
reward. So, there are two possible payoffs: 
If You Receive the Reward     Earnings = 100 – 5 francs 
If The Other Participant Receives the Reward Earnings = 0 – 5 francs 
In Stage 2, both participants will have to choose whether they want to Agree to the outcome of a computer 
coin flip. An example of your decision screen is shown below.  
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If you want to agree, check Agree. If both participants choose to Agree, the computer will assign earnings 
to participants according to the coin flip and the period is over, meaning that neither participant enters Stage 3. 
However, if either participant chooses Don’t Agree, then both participants will enter Stage 3, but the 5 francs will 
be subtracted from both participants since they have agreed in Stage 1 to flip a coin. 
 
YOUR DECISION IN STAGE 3 
If either participant checked Don’t Flip in Stage 1 or checked Don’t Agree in Stage 2, each participant 
enters Stage 3. In this stage, each participant may bid for the 100 franc reward. You may bid any integer number 
of francs between 0 and 100. An example of your decision screen is shown below. 
 
The more you bid, the more likely you are to receive the reward. The more the other participant bids, the 
less likely you are to receive the reward. Specifically, for each franc you bid, you will receive 1 lottery ticket and 
for each franc the other participant bids, the other participant will receives 1 lottery ticket. After both participants 
make their bids, the computer will draw randomly one ticket among all the tickets purchased by you and the other 
participant. The owner of the winning ticket receives the reward of 100 francs. Each ticket has an equal chance of 
winning. So your chance of receiving the reward is given by the number of tickets you buy divided by the total 
number of tickets bought by you and the other participant. 
Chance of Receiving the Reward = Your Total Lottery Tickets 
 Sum of Your and Other Participant’s Lottery Tickets 
If both participants bid zero the reward is randomly assigned to one of the two participants. 
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After both participants make their bids, your earnings for the period are calculated. Regardless of who 
receives the reward, both participants will have to pay their bids. So your earnings will be calculated in the 
following way: 
If either participant decided Don’t Flip in Stage 1: 
If you receive the reward:       Earnings = 100 – Your Bid 
If you do not receive the reward:      Earnings = 0 – Your Bid 
If both participants decided Flip in Stage 1, but either participant decided Don’t Agree in Stage 2: 
If you receive the reward:       Earnings = 100 – Your Bid – 5 francs 
If you do not receive the reward:      Earnings = 0 – Your Bid – 5 francs 
 
Remember you have already earned a $20.00 participation fee (equivalent to 2,000 francs). In any period, 
you may receive either positive or negative earnings. At the end of the experiment we will sum the total earnings for 
all 30 periods of the experiment and convert them to a U.S. dollar payment. If the summed earnings are negative, we 
will subtract them from your participation fee. If the summed earnings are positive, we will add them to your 
participation fee. 
 
An Example 
This is a hypothetical example used to illustrate how the computer determines who wins the reward of 100 
francs. If you bid 30 francs and the other participant bids 20 francs, then you receive 30 lottery tickets and the other 
participant receives 20 lottery tickets. Then the computer randomly draws one lottery ticket out of 50 (30 + 20).  As 
you can see, you have a higher chance of receiving the reward, 0.60 = 30/50.  The other participant has a 0.40 = 
20/50 chance of receiving the reward. 
After both participants bid, the computer will make a random draw that will determine who receives the 
reward. Then the computer will calculate your period earnings based on your bid and whether you received the 
reward or not. 
At the end of each period, the computer will display all decision in all three stages on the outcome screen. 
Once the outcome screen is displayed you should record your results for the period on your Personal Record Sheet 
under the appropriate heading. An example of the outcome screen is shown below. 
 
 
IMPORTANT NOTES 
 In each period, you and another participant have the opportunity to receive a reward worth 100 francs. In 
Stage 1 each participant chooses either Flip or Don’t Flip. If both participants choose Flip, then both participants 
pay 5 francs and the experiment moves to Stage 2. In Stage 2 the outcome of the coin flip is revealed, and both 
participants choose either Agree or Don’t Agree. If both participants choose Agree, the outcome of the coin flip is 
made final and the payoffs are computed for each participant. On the other hand, if either participant chooses Don’t 
Flip in Stage 1 or if either participant chooses Don’t Agree in Stage 2, both participants enter Stage 3. Then, each 
participant submits a bid for the reward, and the reward is allocated by a random computerized draw. Are there any 
questions? 
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Appendix B  (Not for Publication) – Additional Figures 
 
Figure B1: Time Series of Conflict Expenditures by Pair, Exogenous-Free Treatment 
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Figure B2: Time Series of Conflict Expenditures by Pair, Endogenous-Free Treatment 
 
Panels ordered from the top by probability of conflict.  
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Figure B3: Time Series of Conflict Expenditures by Pair, Endogenous-Costly Treatment 
 
Panels ordered from the top by probability of conflict. 
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Figure B4: Probability of Both Opting-in vs. Conditional Probability of Both Committing 
(Endogenous-Free and Endogenous-Costly Treatments, All Periods) 
 
 
Note: Each point represents the probability of opting-in and the conditional probability of commitment for a single 
pair over all 30 periods; the lines plot smoothing spline fits to the data with 3 DF. 
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Figure B5: Average Profits, Opting-in and Commitment by Pair and Treatment  
 (All Periods) 
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